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ANOTHER THORN IN THE
“SEMANTIC BRIAR PATCH”
OF THE HANGING PARAGRAPH:1
IS NEGATIVE EQUITY A PURCHASE MONEY
SECURITY INTEREST?
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2006, Lisa Kay Weiser purchased a 2006 Toyota RAV4 for
around $30,000.2 When Lisa discovered that she could not afford the
payments on the RAV4, she traded it in for a 2006 Pontiac G6 at Van
Chevrolet. The ―sticker‖ price of the Pontiac was $14,434.50. Van Chevrolet
gave Lisa $21,000 as a trade-in allowance for the RAV4, leaving a balance of
$9,031.64 due and owing on her loan to Toyota Motor Finance for the RAV4.
Van Chevrolet added this amount to Lisa‘s loan for the Pontiac, along with
$2,555 for an extended warranty and $750 for ―gap‖ insurance.3 Lisa
financed a total of $26,771.14 at 10.55% interest, payable in seventy-five
monthly installments of $491.13 each. Shortly after the transaction, Van
Chevrolet assigned its interest in the loan to Community America.
Lisa filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on March 12, 2007.
Community America filed a claim for $28,251.24.4 In her Chapter 13 plan,
Lisa proposed to pay $15,295 (the current value of the Pontiac) as a secured
claim to Community America, and the remainder of the balance due to
Community America would be paid as an unsecured claim. Community
America objected to confirmation of Lisa‘s plan, arguing that it was entitled
to full payment of its claim under § 1325(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.5 A
provision in § 1325(a) disallows the sort of bifurcation that Lisa proposed for
Community America‘s claim. The provision applies if the claim is a purchase
money security interest on a personal vehicle purchased within 910 days of
1. Courts and commentators have given the ―hanging paragraph‖ in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) many
scurrilous nicknames. This particular one was given by Judge Dunn in In re Johnson, 380 B.R. 236,
238 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007).
2. The facts are taken from In re Weiser, 381 B.R. 263, 265 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2007). These
facts represent the typical situation where a debtor finances negative equity with her new car loan,
and this Comment will refer to the same factual scenario throughout.
3. Gap insurance covers the difference between a car‘s value and the amount owed to the
lienholder if the car were to be destroyed in an accident or by other means. In re Weiser, 381 B.R. at
265 n.1.
4. Presumably, the claim includes amounts for interest, late charges, and attorney‘s fees. Lisa
did not object to the amount of the claim.
5. The Bankruptcy Code is contained in Title 11 of the United States Code. Future statutory
references are to the 2006 version of Title 11, unless otherwise indicated.
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the bankruptcy filing. The dispute in Lisa‘s case centered on whether
Community America had a purchase money security interest in the $9,031.64
it financed for the remaining amount due on the RAV4 loan (called ―negative
equity‖).6 The bankruptcy court ruled that it was and that Lisa‘s Chapter 13
plan had to provide for payment of Community America‘s entire claim.
The issue of whether a creditor has a purchase money security interest in
the negative equity portion of a car loan prompted a great deal of litigation.
The early majority of bankruptcy courts held that negative equity was not a
purchase money security interest.7 But as the decisions were appealed, nearly
every circuit court to hear the issue has held that negative equity can form the
basis for a purchase money security interest. As of this writing, eight of the
nine circuit courts to consider the issue have held that negative equity from a
trade-in that is rolled into a loan for the purchase of a new car is purchase
money debt that is not subject to bifurcation under § 1325(a).8 The Ninth
Circuit came to the opposite conclusion, however, and two of the circuit
decisions drew vigorous dissents.9 Despite the clear majority in the circuit
6. Negative equity is the term used for the amount by which the debt exceeds the value of the
collateral at the time of the trade-in. In re Callicott, 386 B.R. 232, 236 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2008); see
also In re Hampton, No. 07-14990, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2551, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio June 16,
2008) (―‗Negative equity‘ is . . . the amount by which the outstanding loan balance . . . exceeds the
value of the trade-in vehicle.‖).
7. 2 BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ¶ 12.05[10][b], at 12-113 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2009); see also
In re Crawford, 397 B.R. 461, 467 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008); In re Hernandez, 388 B.R. 883, 885
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008); In re Munzberg, 388 B.R. 529, 548 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2008); In re Padgett, 389
B.R. 203, 213 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008); In re Callicott, 386 B.R. 232, 237 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2008);
In re Look, 383 B.R. 210, 219 (Bankr. D. Me. 2008); In re Conyers, 379 B.R. 576, 582 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. 2007); In re Hayes, 376 B.R. 655, 672–73 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007); In re Sanders, 377
B.R. 836, 864 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007); In re Blakeslee, 377 B.R. 724, 731 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007);
In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 154 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re Acaya, 369 B.R. 564, 571 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 2007); In re Price, 363 B.R. 734, 741 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007); In re Vega, 344 B.R. 616,
623 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006).
8. Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2010); Howard
v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 2010); Reiber v. GMAC,
LLC (In re Peaslee), 585 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2009); Dale v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dale), 582
F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2009); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d
740, 743 (8th Cir. 2009); Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1286
(10th Cir. 2009); Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 629 (4th Cir.
2009); Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008). The
Second Circuit certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals, which held that the negative
equity was a purchase money security interest. Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 913 N.E.2d
387, 388 (N.Y. 2009).
9. Americredit Fin. Servs. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), No. 08-60037, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS
14588 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010); In re Mierkowski, 580 F.3d at 743 (Bye, J., dissenting); In re Ford,
574 F.3d at 1286 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting); see also Nuvell Credit Co. v. Callicott (In re Callicott),
580 F.3d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 2009) (Bye, J., concurring) (Judge Bye indicated that he was still
unpersuaded by the majority opinion, but that he was bound by the decision in In re Mierkowski).
The New York Court of Appeals decision also drew a harsh dissent. Reiber, 913 N.E.2d at 391
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courts that negative equity can form the basis for a purchase money security
interest, the resolution of the issue is still, as the Eleventh Circuit put it, a
―close call.‖10
I disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority of the circuit courts,
and I concur with the Ninth Circuit and the majority of bankruptcy courts that
negative equity can form the basis of a purchase money security interest.11
Negative equity is essentially antecedent debt that is not the type of obligation
covered by the definition of purchase money security interest in the Uniform
Commercial Code. Unfortunately, given that so many circuit courts have held
that negative equity is purchase money debt, the remaining circuits are unlikely
to come to the opposite conclusion.12 Action from Congress is necessary to
clarify what it meant when it wrote the term into the Bankruptcy Code.
In Part II of this Comment, I will provide an explanation of the statutory
background at issue in this debate, the significance of a purchase money
security interest, and the interplay between state and federal law; in Part III, I
will discuss the reasoning given by the circuit courts and analyze the merits of
their various arguments; and in Part IV, I will explore some additional
considerations in making the determination of whether negative equity
financing can form the basis of a purchase money security interest.
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND OTHER PRELIMINARY MATTERS
A. The Purchase Money “Super-Priority”
For the purposes of this Comment, there are three types of creditors in a
bankruptcy proceeding: unsecured creditors, secured creditors, and purchase
money creditors. Unsecured creditors lend money to the debtor based on
nothing more than the debtor‘s promise to repay the money. The creditor‘s
return on his investment depends on the debtor‘s continued solvency.
(Smith, J., dissenting).
10. In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1301.
11. Courts are also divided on the question of whether amounts financed for gap insurance and
service contracts should be classified as a purchase money security interest. Compare In re
Spratling, 377 B.R. 941, 943 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2007) (funds loaned for insurance and warranty can
be a purchase money security interest); In re Macon, 376 B.R. 778, 781–83 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007)
(same); In re Murray, 352 B.R. 340, 347–49, 354 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006) (same), with In re
Honcoop, 377 B.R. 719, 724 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (funds loaned for insurance cannot be a
purchase money security interest); In re White, 352 B.R. 633, 648 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006) (same).
Interestingly, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Tenth Circuit concluded that, while negative
equity is a purchase money security interest, funds advanced for gap insurance and a service contract
are not. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Miller (In re Miller), No. KS-09-003, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3627, at
*8, 13–14 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Nov. 19, 2009).
12. See In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 575 n.8 (―Our conclusion is bolstered by general prudential
concerns with creating unnecessary circuit splits.‖). But see In re Penrod, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS
14588, at *5–6 (―We acknowledge that our decision creates a circuit split, and we do not do this
lightly.‖).
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Unsecured creditors cannot turn to the debtor‘s assets or belongings to satisfy
the debt obligation without going through a complex scheme of state
procedures for obtaining a judgment, attaching a judgment lien, and executing
on the judgment lien. If the debtor goes bankrupt, the unsecured creditor
receives a pro rata share of the debtor‘s estate along with the rest of the
unsecured creditors.
Secured creditors, on the other hand, can look to either the debtor or a
piece of the debtor‘s property for payment. The debtor typically grants the
creditor a property interest, called a ―security interest,‖ in a piece of the
debtor‘s property, the collateral.13 If the debtor stops making his payments on
the debt, the creditor can simply foreclose on the collateral.14 If the creditor
has leftover money after selling the collateral and satisfying the loan, he must
return it to the debtor. But if, as is often the case, the proceeds of the sale are
not enough to satisfy the loan obligation, the debtor still owes to the creditor
the remaining amount, called a ―deficiency.‖15 Obviously, it is in the secured
creditor‘s best interest for the outstanding balance on the loan to be less than
the market value of the property.
Two or more creditors may take a security interest in the same piece of
property. Problems may arise, however, when the debtor defaults on the
loans, and the piece of property must be seized and sold. If the value of the
property is less than the amount due on the loans, who gets paid first?
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), which governs security
interests, sets forth several rules for determining which creditor is ―first in
line‖ to receive its payment. In general, the U.C.C. follows the ―first in time,
first in line‖ rule, which provides that the first creditor to perfect his security
interest is the first in line to be paid from the proceeds of the collateral.16
This rule makes it difficult for a debtor, typically a business, to buy a new
piece of machinery or equipment on credit if any new assets are covered by an
after-acquired property clause.17 Anyone lending money to a debtor to buy a
new machine cannot take a first-position security interest in the machine
because the blanket security interest was filed first.18 The new lender would
13. 4 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 30-1, at 3–4,
§ 30-2, at 14–15 (6th ed. 2010).
14. Id. § 34-4, at 412.
15. Id. Depending on the type of property and the type of loan, the loan may be either recourse
or nonrecourse. Recourse loans allow the creditor to go back to the debtor to demand payment of the
deficiency after the property is sold. If the loan is nonrecourse, the creditor‘s seizure of the property
satisfies the loan in full, regardless of the remaining amount due or the value of the collateral.
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1020–21 (9th ed. 2009). Nonrecourse loans, therefore, are riskier for
the creditor because of the risk that collateral will depreciate in value.
16. U.C.C. § 9-322 (2001); 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 33-3, at 323–26.
17. U.C.C. § 9-204 (2001); 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 33-3, at 327.
18. 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 33-4, at 331.
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have to get in line behind the blanket creditor before he could be paid in the
event of a default.
Enter the purchase money security interest (PMSI). The PMSI functions
as a ―super-priority‖ security interest by upsetting the normal first-in-time
rule.19 Section 9-103 of the U.C.C. provides that a PMSI has priority over a
prior security interest even though the PMSI creditor perfected its security
interest later.20 A creditor with a PMSI has a first-in-line priority interest in
the machinery over liens that were first in time.21 The concept of PMSI is
based on equitable notions—―it protects vendors of goods from after-acquired
property clauses generally used by banks and financiers.‖22
In addition to exemption from the first-in-time rule, holders of PMSIs enjoy
several other benefits. First, a lender with a PMSI in consumer goods does not
need to file a financing statement to perfect its lien.23 Second, debtors in
bankruptcy can avoid nonpossessory, non-PMSIs in certain assets, but they
cannot avoid nonpossessory PMSIs.24 Because of these powerful advantages,
PMSIs should be narrowly construed to avoid unfair treatment to other creditors.
B. The “Hanging Paragraph” in Section 1325(a)
Prior to 2005, the amount of a secured creditor‘s claim in a Chapter 13
bankruptcy depended on the value of the creditor‘s collateral. Section 506(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code provides in pertinent part:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on
property in which the estate has an interest . . . is a secured
claim to the extent of the value of such creditor‘s interest in
the estate‘s interest in such property . . . and is an unsecured
claim to the extent that the value of such creditor‘s
interest . . . is less than the amount of such allowed claim.25
This section is important for debtors that owe more on a loan than the
19. See Keith G. Meyer, A Primer on Purchase Money Security Interests Under Revised
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 50 KAN. L. REV. 143, 149–50 (2001); see also Juliet M.
Moringiello, A Tale of Two Codes: Examining § 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, § 9-103 of the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Proper Role of State Law in Bankruptcy, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 863,
883 (2001) (―The purchase-money secured party has an exalted status under Article 9 of the
U.C.C.‖).
20. 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 33-4, at 330.
21. See U.C.C. § 9-322.
22. Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 845 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2008).
23. U.C.C. § 9-309(a) (2001).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(B) (2006). In fact, the Federal Trade Commission considers the
taking of a non-PMSI in certain household goods to be an unfair credit practice. 16 C.F.R.
§ 444.2(a)(4) (2010).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006).

1222

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:1217

collateral is worth. Under this section, once a debtor files bankruptcy, the
secured creditor‘s claim is split into two parts: a secured claim up to the value
of the collateral, and an unsecured claim for the remaining portion. This
practice of separating, or ―bifurcating,‖ a creditor‘s lien into secured and
unsecured portions is known as ―lien stripping‖ or ―cramdown‖ because the
value of the creditor‘s lien is ―stripped‖ or ―crammed down‖ to the value of
the collateral. For example, if Lisa‘s Chapter 13 case was filed before 2005,
Community America would have a secured claim up to the value of the
Pontiac on the date of Lisa‘s filing, which Lisa asserted was $15,295.26
Community America then would have an unsecured claim for the remaining
balance of the loan.
The secured status of a claim is particularly important in a Chapter 13
case. Section 1325(a)(5) provides that a Chapter 13 plan cannot be confirmed
unless the secured creditor approves the plan, the debtor surrenders the
property subject to the secured claim, or the plan provides for payment in full
of the secured portion of the claim. A creditor is not likely to approve a
Chapter 13 plan that does not pay the entire amount of its claim, so the plan
must pay the secured portion of the claim in full if a debtor wants to keep the
encumbered property. The unsecured portion of a crammed-down claim,
however, need not be paid in full before the plan can be confirmed—the
unsecured portion is paid pro rata with all of the other unsecured claims.27
In 2005, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).28 BAPCPA dramatically
altered the previous cramdown practice for automobiles by adding an
unnumbered paragraph at the end of § 1325(a) (the ―hanging paragraph‖).29
The hanging paragraph provides:
For purposes of paragraph (5), section 506 shall not apply

26. In re Weiser, 381 B.R. 263, 266 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2007).
27. This cramdown process essentially mimics the same result as if the creditor had foreclosed
on the vehicle to satisfy the debt after the debtor defaulted, but the debtor gets to keep the property.
In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 844 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007). The creditor receives full payment of the
market value of the vehicle over the life of the Chapter 13 plan, and is left with an unsecured
deficiency claim for the portion over and above the market value of the car.
28. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). The statute was enacted on April 20, 2005, and
applies to bankruptcy cases commenced on or after October 17, 2005. See id. at 23, 216.
29. This paragraph has been referred to as ―§ 1325(a)(9),‖ ―§ 1325(a)(*),‖ the ―unnumbered
paragraph,‖ and the ―hanging paragraph.‖ Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537
F.3d 1295, 1296 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008); see also, e.g., Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall),
599 F.3d 498, 501 (6th Cir. 2010) (―The relevant provision appears as an unnumbered paragraph
following § 1325(a), now commonly referred to as the ‗hanging paragraph‘ . . . .‖). Much
controversy has surrounded the meaning of this paragraph, but many of these issues are outside the
scope of this Comment, which is only concerned with the effect of negative equity on the PMSI
status of the claim.
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to a claim described in that paragraph if the creditor has a
purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the
subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within the 910-day
[sic] preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the
collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle . . . .30
The effect of this paragraph is to exempt a creditor from the cramdown
effects of § 506(a) when the requirements of the paragraph are satisfied.31 The
claim must meet four requirements to be exempted from bifurcation under
§ 506(a): (1) The debt must be secured by a PMSI; (2) the debt must have been
incurred within 910 days of the date of the bankruptcy filing; (3) the collateral
must consist of a motor vehicle; and (4) the collateral must be acquired for the
personal use of the debtor.32 If the requirements are met, the hanging
paragraph functions as an ―anti-cramdown‖ provision—because § 506(a) no
longer applies, the debtor is prevented from bifurcating the creditor‘s claim
into secured and unsecured portions, regardless of the collateral‘s value on the
date of filing.33 The entire claim, including the portion over and above the
value of the collateral, must be paid through the Chapter 13 plan.34 If the
hanging paragraph applies in Lisa‘s case, Lisa‘s Chapter 13 plan would have to
provide for payment of Community America‘s full claim of $28,251.24,
regardless of the value of the car on the date of filing.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006). In addition to the fact that the paragraph is not numbered like
the rest of § 1325(a), there seems to be a missing noun after ―910-day.‖ Congress likely meant to say
―910-day period.‖ The hanging paragraph also applies to ―any other thing of value‖ purchased
within one year of filing. Id. This Comment is concerned only with the automobile provision,
though the analysis would apply with the same force to any other asset where the loan included
antecedent debt unrelated to the purchase price of the collateral.
31. Section 506(a) is the only section in the Bankruptcy Code that gives secured creditors an
allowed claim. Presumably, Congress meant that the bifurcation of claims allowed by § 506(a) does
not apply, not that the entire section does not apply. See Citifinancial Auto v. Hernandez-Simpson,
369 B.R. 36, 41 (D. Kan. 2007); 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1325.06[1][a] (Alan N. Resnick &
Henry J. Sommer eds., rev. 15th ed. 2008).
32. The second, third, and fourth requirements are easily determined, although some litigation
has resulted from the question of whether a vehicle was purchased for the personal use of the debtor.
See, e.g., In re Matthews, 378 B.R. 481, 489 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007) (discussing whether a vehicle was
purchased for the debtor‘s personal use). This Comment is concerned only with the question of
whether the first requirement, purchase money status, is satisfied when negative equity is financed in
addition to the purchase price.
33. At least one commentator has argued that the hanging paragraph merely exempts the claim
from § 506(a), and the court is free to apply any other method of valuation except the one prescribed in
§ 506(a). Jean Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux: The Terms for Holding on to Cars, Homes
and Other Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 457, 469–74 (2005). Braucher
argues that courts should apply the wholesale value to cars in bankruptcy because a lender foreclosing
on the car would sell it at wholesale after repossession. Id. This Comment continues under the widely
accepted view that by exempting the claim from application of § 506(a), bifurcation of the claim is not
allowed and the creditor has a fully secured claim, regardless of the value of the collateral.
34. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).
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C. Defining Purchase Money Security Interest—State Law vs. Federal Law
Unfortunately, the Bankruptcy Code does not define the term ―purchase
money security interest.‖35 The phrase ―purchase money security interest‖ is
a term of art, and it has no ―ordinary or generally understood‖ meaning in the
context of the Bankruptcy Code.36 Purchase money status was intended to
resolve conflicts over which creditor‘s claim would receive priority—and thus
receive payment first—in the event of a default.37 The PMSI super-priority
facilitates the harmony and coexistence of after-acquired property clauses that
reduce risk in commercial loans and credit transactions for new equipment
and machinery. The Bankruptcy Code injected confusion by affording
purchase money creditors additional benefits that are unrelated to the priority
of conflicting security interests. Indeed, the term is used only three times in
the Code.38
The bankruptcy provisions that place the most emphasis on purchase money
status relate to consumer transactions,39 but the U.C.C. provides little guidance
regarding PMSIs in the consumer context.40 Courts are left to grapple with the
status of transactions for which PMSIs were never meant to have any relevance
because conflicting priorities in consumer goods are a rarity.
The Supreme Court long ago ruled that ―property rights in the assets of a
bankrupt‘s estate‖ are a matter of state law.41 Security interests are essentially
property interests, so the extent of a creditor‘s security interest is a question of
state law. But the question of whether negative equity might be part of a
PMSI in a consumer vehicle does not arise outside of bankruptcy law, leaving
a dearth of state law on the issue.42
When the state law on a subject is unsettled, a federal court has four
options: (1) It can abstain from deciding the issue and refer the parties to state

35. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). The term is used in only two other places in the Code,
§ 522(f)(1)(B) and § 1110(d)(2).
36. Dale v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2009).
37. See supra Part II.A.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(B) (2006) (allowing a debtor to avoid a ―nonpossessory,
nonpurchase-money security interest‖ if the debt encumbers an exempt asset); 11 U.S.C.
§ 1110(d)(2) (2006) (allowing creditors to repossess certain types of aircraft in Chapter 11
proceedings); 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (hanging paragraph).
39. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(f)(1)(B), 1325(a).
40. Section 9-103 contains detailed rules for non-consumer goods transactions regarding
payment allocation and mixed transactions that contain purchase money and non-purchase money
components. Section 9-103(h) explains that the U.C.C. is deliberately silent regarding certain rules
for PMSIs in the consumer context.
41. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979).
42. Indeed, there is a dearth of state law on PMSIs in general. I conducted a search of all state
cases on LexisNexis for the term ―purchase money security interest,‖ and the search yielded only 783
results. The same search in all federal cases yielded 2,257 results.
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court; (2) it can certify the question to the highest court of the state; (3) it can
try to predict how the state court will decide the issue; or (4) it can make the
decision for the state court.43 The first option cannot be used to solve the
PMSI question because the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
bankruptcy proceedings.44 The second option is not realistic because it would
require certification to all fifty states before the law on the issue would be
settled.45 The federal courts addressing the negative equity issue are therefore
left attempting to apply the nearly nonexistent state law to find an answer to
the question.
The problem with turning to state law is that the U.C.C. drafters
specifically cautioned against using section 9-103 to determine whether a
creditor holds a PMSI in bankruptcy proceedings. In Official Comment 8, the
drafters explained their hesitance to include consumer goods in certain
provisions of section 9-103:
This section addresses only whether a security interest is
a ―purchase-money security interest‖ under this Article,
primarily for purposes of perfection and priority. . . .
Whether a security interest is a ―purchase-money security
interest‖ under other law is determined by that law. . . . The
Bankruptcy Code does not expressly adopt the state law
definition of ―purchase-money security interest.‖ Where
federal law does not defer to this Article, this Article does
not, and could not, determine a question of federal law.46
Indeed, the definition of ―purchase money security interest‖ has become a
matter of federal interpretation. The federal courts that purport to interpret the
laws of different states rely on federal authority, rather than state law, for their
opinions.47 Even the lone state court to address the issue relied solely on

43. Jeffrey C. Alexander, Note, The Law/Fact Distinction and Unsettled State Law in the
Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 157, 160–65 (1985).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2006).
45. See, e.g., Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 547 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2008). The Second
Circuit noted the absence of state law on the negative equity issue and certified the question to the
New York Court of Appeals. Id. at 186–87. The length of time for a question to be certified and
answered is also a relevant consideration. Peaslee filed her Chapter 13 petition on July 11, 2006, the
New York Court of Appeals did not answer the certified question until June 24, 2009, Reiber v.
GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 913 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 2009), and the Second Circuit did not reverse
the bankruptcy court decision until October 9, 2009, Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 585 F.3d
53 (2d Cir. 2009).
46. U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 8 (2001).
47. Dale v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 575 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009) (―Our
conclusion is bolstered by general prudential concerns with creating unnecessary circuit splits.‖);
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 743 (―This court strives to
maintain uniformity in the law among the circuits, whenever reasoned analysis will allow.‖) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
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federal cases in reaching its conclusions.48 But only one case examining the
negative equity issue has seriously considered whether a federal rule ought to
be adopted.49 Instead, the courts purport to base their decisions on the state
versions of U.C.C. section 9-103.
Further illustrating the need for a federal rule is the fact that all fifty states
have adopted the relevant provisions of the U.C.C.50 But the lack of state law
on the meaning of PMSI has led different bankruptcy courts in the same
district to render different interpretations of the same law.51 Congress can and
should define ―purchase money security interest‖ in the Bankruptcy Code.
Until it does, however, courts must look to state law—and only state law—to
define the extent of a creditor‘s security interest because it is a property right.

48. See In re Peaslee, 913 N.E.2d at 389–91.
49. See In re Westfall, 376 B.R. 210, 212 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007). Courts grappling with
other issues raised by the hanging paragraph have advocated a national rule. See AmeriCredit Fin.
Servs. v. Long (In re Long), 519 F.3d 288, 291 (6th Cir. 2008) (suggesting a national rule regarding
the consequences of surrendering a vehicle covered by the hanging paragraph).
50. All fifty states (and the District of Columbia) have adopted § 9-103 of the U.C.C., which
defines the term ―purchase money security interest.‖ ALA. CODE § 7-9A-103 (LexisNexis 2006);
ALASKA STAT. § 45.29.103 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-9103 (2005); ARK. CODE. ANN.
§ 4-9-103 (2001); CAL. COM. CODE § 9103 (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-9-103 (2009);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-9-103a (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 9-103 (2005); D.C.
CODE § 28:9-103 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.1031 (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 11-9-103
(2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490:9-103 (LexisNexis 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-9-103
(2001); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-103 (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9.1-103
(LexisNexis 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.9103 (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-103 (Supp.
2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.9-103 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-103
(2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 9-1103 (Supp. 2009); MD. CODE. ANN., COM. LAW. § 9-103
(LexisNexis 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 9-103 (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 440.9103 (West 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.9-103 (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 75-9-103 (2002); MO. ANN. STAT. § 400.9-103 (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-9A-103
(2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-103 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 104.9103 (LexisNexis 2007);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:9-103 (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-103 (West 2004);
N.M. STAT. § 55-9-103 (2001); N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 9-103 (Consol. Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-9-103 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-03 (Supp. 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.103
(LexisNexis 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-9-103 (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 79.0103
(2007); 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9103 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-9-103 (2001);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-103 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-9-103 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-9-103 (2001); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.103 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 70A-9a-103 (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 9-103 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-103 (2001);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9A-103 (West 2003); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-9-103 (LexisNexis
2007); WIS. STAT. § 409.103 (2007–2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34.1-9-103 (2009).
A few states have adopted a slightly modified version, but the definition of purchase money
security interest remains the same. See infra note 190.
51. Compare In re Ford, 387 B.R. 827, 833 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008) (negative equity included in
PMSI), and In re Dunlap, 383 B.R. 113, 119 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008) (same), with In re Padgett, 389
B.R. 203, 213 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008) (negative equity not included in PMSI), and In re Crawford,
397 B.R. 461, 467 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008) (same).
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III. FINDING A MEANING FOR ―PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST‖
The ―plethora of cases‖52 addressing the negative equity issue that have
been decided since the BAPCPA was enacted are split into two categories.
The first group of courts—the Ninth Circuit and the early majority of
bankruptcy courts—holds that the negative equity portion of an auto loan
cannot form the basis of a purchase money security interest.53 The second
group, which includes eight of the circuit decisions to date, holds that the
negative equity portion of the loan does not alter the purchase money nature
of the security interest, and that the entire claim is subject to the anticramdown provisions of the hanging paragraph. The arguments advanced on
each side of the issue are invariable from one case to the next.54 This Part
provides an overview and analysis of the arguments that the circuit courts
have relied on to determine that a PMSI can include negative equity,
ultimately concluding that the reasoning of the circuit courts is flawed and the
better holding is that negative equity cannot be included in a PMSI.
A. Official Comment 3 and the (Non)Exhaustive List of Expenses
Because the term ―purchase money security interest‖ is not defined in the
Bankruptcy Code, courts look to state law for the definition.55 Every state has
adopted section 9-103 of the U.C.C. without substantial revision.56 Thus,
each of the courts to address the issue is essentially examining the same law.
52. In re Myers, 393 B.R. 616, 618 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2008). In fact, the issue has generated
nearly ninety opinions from bankruptcy courts, district courts, and circuit courts. See, e.g., infra note 53.
53. See AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), No. 08-60037, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS
14588 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010); Nuvell Credit Co. v. Callicott (In re Callicott), 396 B.R. 506, 510
(E.D. Mo. 2008); Bank of America v. Look, No. 08-129-P-H, 2008 WL 2789477 (D. Me. July 17,
2008); Citifinancial Auto v. Hernandez-Simpson, 369 B.R. 36, 48 (D. Kan. 2007); In re McCauley,
398 B.R. 41, 45 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008); In re Crawford, 397 B.R. 461, 467 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008);
In re Busby, 393 B.R. 443, 452 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2008); In re Brodowski, 391 B.R. 393, 403–04
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008); In re Mancini, 390 B.R. 796, 805 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008); In re Hernandez,
388 B.R. 883, 885 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008); In re Munzberg, 388 B.R. 529, 548 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2008);
In re Look, 383 B.R. 210, 219 (Bankr. D. Me. 2008); In re Johnson, 380 B.R. 236, 250 (Bankr. D. Or.
2007); In re Lavigne, No. 07-30192, 2007 WL 3469454, at *8 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2007); In re
Mitchell, 379 B.R. 131, 142 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007); In re Conyers, 379 B.R. 576, 582 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. 2007); In re Hayes, 376 B.R. 655, 672–73 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007); In re Sanders, 377
B.R. 836, 864 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007); In re Blakeslee, 377 B.R. 724, 731 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007);
In re Kellerman, 377 B.R. 302, 303 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007); In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 154 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 2007); In re Acaya, 369 B.R. 564, 571 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007); In re Price, 363 B.R. 734,
741 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007); In re Vega, 344 B.R. 616, 623 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006).
54. For example, Professor Ingrid Hillinger from Boston College Law School indicated that she
had filed the same amicus brief in three circuit cases. Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Meaning of
―Purchase Money Security Interest‖ Under Section 1325(a)(9)(*) (a.k.a. the Hanging Paragraph)
(2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
55. See supra Part II.C.
56. See supra note 50. The only real deviation that some states have made is to eliminate the
consumer/non-consumer distinction in section 9-103. See infra note 190.
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Article 9 of the U.C.C. was revised in 2001. Prior to the revision, the
definition of ―purchase money security interest‖ had two prongs: (1) an
interest ―taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of
its price,‖ and (2) an interest taken by a third party who ―gives value to enable
the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact so
used.‖57 The first prong protected sellers who financed the sale themselves,
and the second prong protected third-party financiers, e.g., banks and other
lenders. Creditors asserting a PMSI could prevail if they satisfied either
prong.
Revised Article 9 defines ―purchase-money security interest‖ via a more
circuitous route.58 Section 9-103(b) provides that ―[a] security interest in
goods is a purchase-money security interest . . . to the extent that the goods
are purchase-money collateral with respect to that security interest.‖
―Purchase-money collateral‖ is defined as ―goods or software that secures a
purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral.‖59
―Purchase-money obligation‖ is defined as ―an obligation of an obligor
incurred as all or part of the price of the collateral or for value given to enable
the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the collateral if the value is in fact
so used.‖60 Revised Article 9 simply eliminates the distinction between the
seller and the third-party lender, allowing either to take a PMSI for the price
of the collateral or the value given to enable the debtor to acquire the
collateral.61
The text of the U.C.C. provides little guidance to determine whether
something is part of the ―price of the collateral‖ or the ―value given to enable
the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral‖ such that it becomes part of the
PMSI. Comment 3 to section 9-103 provides more insight. Comment 3
provides that
the ―price‖ of collateral or the ―value given to enable‖
includes obligations for expenses incurred in connection with
acquiring rights in the collateral, sales taxes, duties, finance
57. U.C.C. § 9-107 (1972).
58. U.C.C. § 9-103 (2001).
59. U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(1).
60. U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2).
61. See U.C.C. § 9-103. A few debtors have tried to argue that Revised Article 9 retains the
distinction, and that because the PMSI was originally taken by the dealer (who is the seller), the
lender has a PMSI for only the price of the collateral. See, e.g., Dale v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re
Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 573–74 (5th Cir. 2009). The argument has not been successful. See id. at 574
(―[T]he creditor prevails if the debt at issue satisfies either prong.‖); see also Ford v. Ford Motor
Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1284 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009) (asserting that the terms ―price‖
and ―value given to enable‖ are equivalent). But see AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. v. Penrod,
No. 08-60037, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14588, at *15 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010) (holding that the
―price‖ prong applies only to sellers and the ―value given‖ prong applies to third-party financiers).
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charges, interest, freight charges, costs of storage in transit,
demurrage, administrative charges, expenses of collection and
enforcement, attorney‘s fees, and other similar obligations.62
Comment 3 goes on to provide that ―[t]he concept of ‗purchase-money
security interest‘ requires a close nexus between the acquisition of collateral
and the secured obligation.‖63 The circuit courts have generally found that
negative equity is included in the price of the collateral, it is value given to
enable the debtor to acquire the collateral, and it bears a ―close nexus‖ to the
financing transaction. As I explain below, negative equity does not pass any
of these tests.
1. Price of the Collateral
There is no question that Comment 3 to the U.C.C. does not include
negative equity in the list of things that can be included in the price of the
collateral or the value given to enable purchase of the collateral.64 Whether
negative equity fits in the laundry list of examples given in the comment is a
matter of how a court views the connection between the examples listed in
Comment 3.
a. Ejusdem Generis
Almost without fail, debtors have attempted to invoke the canon of
statutory construction known as ejusdem generis. The doctrine of ejusdem
generis provides that ―[w]here general words follow specific words in a
statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only
objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific
words.‖65 Therefore, the phrase ―other similar obligations‖ at the end of the
list must be construed to include only obligations that are similar to the
obligations specifically enumerated in Comment 3. Debtors argue that the
enumerated obligations are best categorized as ―transaction costs.‖ Negative
equity is not analogous to the rest of the items because it is not a typical cost
of completing the transaction, such as sales taxes, finance charges, and
administrative expenses.
The circuit courts have flatly rejected the debtors‘ arguments, but for
differing reasons. The Fifth Circuit rejected a debtor‘s attempt to invoke the
canon, finding that ―the listed expenses in Comment 3 have no common

62. U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (emphasis added). Roughly half of the states specifically included
the comments in their official state version of the U.C.C. statutes. Most annotated versions of the
state statutes published by West or Lexis include the U.C.C. comments. See supra note 50.
63. U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3.
64. See id.
65. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47:17, at 358–60 (7th ed. 2007).
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feature beyond an attenuated connection to the acquisition or maintenance of
the vehicle.‖66 It held that negative equity has the same ―attenuated
connection‖ to the acquisition of the vehicle. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit
found that the list in Comment 3 is not ―exhaustive,‖ and that it constitutes
―merely examples‖ of additional components of the price of the collateral.67
The court cited the inclusion of attorney‘s fees in the list as evidence that the
term ―price‖ should be construed broadly. The inclusion of attorney‘s fees
―belies the notion that price or value is narrowly viewed as only those
[traditional] expenses that must be paid to drive the car off the lot.‖68
The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, found that the items listed in
Comment 3 do have a common connection as ―transaction costs‖ for the
purchase of the collateral.69 Like taxes, duties, interest, and freight charges,
negative equity, the Fourth Circuit concluded, is simply a cost associated with
the transaction, and therefore negative equity falls within the definition
provided in Comment 3.70
The Tenth Circuit also found a connection between the items in
Comment 3. It held that the enumerated expenses are incurred so that the
creditor may realize the value of its security interest.71 While the Tenth
Circuit‘s characterization of the connection between the items in Comment 3
is probably the best of the opinions to date, the court improperly characterized
negative equity as being among the expenses incurred so that the creditor can
realize the value of its security interest.
The court held that ―[t]he discharge of negative equity clears the title of
the trade-in vehicle, permitting the creditor to realize the value of the vehicle
it receives as part of the trade.‖72 There are a couple of problems with this
statement. First, the statement assumes that the creditor is the one that
receives the trade-in. It is true that the dealership may in some instances
finance the transaction, but the loan is more often than not immediately sold
to a bank or other financial institution.73 So the fact that the negative equity
66. In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 574.
67. Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2008).
68. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
69. Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 627 (4th Cir. 2009).
70. Id. Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit recognized the strength of the debtor‘s argument that all
of the specific items in Comment 3 are transaction costs, but it refused to limit the breadth of the
phrase ―other similar obligations‖ to transaction costs because the term ―transaction costs‖ was not
used. Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 2009) (―Had the
drafters of the U.C.C. intended to limit a purchase-money security interest to cash price plus
transaction costs, they could easily have done so.‖).
71. In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1285.
72. Id.
73. Indeed, none of the cases that made their way to the circuit level were pursued by
dealerships themselves. Rather, they were pursued by lending institutions, though many of the
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allows the dealer to realize the full value of the trade-in vehicle is in no way
related to the security interest that the bank takes in the new vehicle. The
trade-in allows the dealership, not the secured creditor, to realize the full value
of the trade-in. The secured creditor has no interest in the trade-in and does
not care what value the dealership receives from a trade-in that is not the
creditor‘s collateral.
Second, in the cases involving negative equity, the security interest is in
the new vehicle. Financing negative equity from the trade-in does not allow
the creditor to realize the value of its security interest in the new vehicle.
Negative equity is for the benefit of the dealer (with regard to the old vehicle
only) and for the benefit of the debtor (so that she may buy a new car without
having to pay completely pay off the old one first).
As Judge Tymkovich noted in his dissent from the Tenth Circuit‘s
opinion, each expense in the list ―adds no particular value for either the buyer
or the seller but is instead simply the cost of using the price mechanism.‖74
Things like sales taxes, duties, freight charges, costs of storage in transit,
demurrage, and administrative charges must be paid so the collateral can be
delivered to the buyer. The other items in the list are expenses charged by the
secured creditor itself. Finance charges, interest, expenses of collection and
enforcement, and attorney‘s fees are costs that allow the secured creditor to
realize the value of his security interest because they make it worth the
creditor‘s while to actually lend money to the debtor. Negative equity, on the
other hand, is ―a transfer of money for value.‖75 The creditor provides money
to pay off the balance on the preexisting loan, and the debtor promises to pay
the money back, with interest, and grants the creditor a security interest in the
collateral.
The financing of negative equity is ―completely unrelated to the price of
the [collateral] and its financing or the costs associated with transfer of
title.‖76 The Ninth Circuit adopted this view in holding that the items in
Comment 3 are transaction costs related to the actual purchase of the vehicle,
while negative equity is separable from the purchase transaction.77 Thus, it
cannot be akin to the itemized costs in Comment 3.
b. In Pari Materia
Many of the courts to address the negative equity issue have found that the
institutions are solely in the business of motor vehicle loans.
74. In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1289 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), No. 08-60037, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14588, at *11 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010).
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term ―price‖ as it is used in the U.C.C. is ambiguous because ―the extent or
reach of the term is uncertain.‖78 They then turn to a canon of statutory
interpretation, known as in pari materia, which allows them to construe the
U.C.C. provisions in accordance with price as it is defined in other statutes.79
Statutes are read in pari materia when they relate to the same person, class of
persons, or subject.80
The courts using in pari materia to find the meaning of price have looked
to state retail installment sales act (RISA) statutes and the federal Truth in
Lending Act (TILA).81 For example, in Reiber v. GMAC, the New York
Court of Appeals turned to the New York Motor Vehicle Retail Installment
Sales Act (MVRISA), which includes in ―cash sale price‖ the ―‗unpaid
balance of any amount financed under an outstanding motor vehicle loan
agreement or motor vehicle retail installment contract.‘‖82 The court reasoned
that cash sale price includes negative equity under the MVRISA, so the
negative equity could be part of the price of the collateral under the U.C.C.83
Similarly, in In re Graupner, the bankruptcy court turned to the definition of
―cash sale price‖ in the Georgia Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act. The court
held that ―the Georgia General Assembly intended . . . to permit negative
equity in a trade-in vehicle to be added to the cash sales price of a new vehicle
without precluding the financing creditor or its assignee from taking a
purchase money security interest in the new vehicle.‖84
The courts also find support for their position in TILA.85 TILA directs the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to promulgate regulations for
disclosure of credit terms to consumers.86 The regulations under TILA
provide that the ―total sale price‖ includes the sum of the cash price and any
other amounts financed by the creditor.87 The courts conclude that because
negative equity is an amount financed by the creditor, it is included in cash
sale price under TILA.88 When reading TILA together with the U.C.C., they

78. See In re Graupner, 356 B.R. 907, 919 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006).
79. 2B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 65, § 51:1, at 196.
80. Id. § 51:3, at 235–37.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006).
82. Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 913 N.E.2d 387, 390 (N.Y. 2009) (quoting N.Y.
PERS. PROP. LAW § 301(6) (Consol. Supp. 2009)).
83. Id.
84. In re Graupner, 356 B.R. 907, 923 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006), aff’d, Graupner v. Nuvell
Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1289 (11th Cir. 2008).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1601.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2006).
87. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(j) (2010).
88. See, e.g., GMAC v. Horne, 390 B.R. 191, 202–03 (E.D. Va. 2008).
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conclude that negative equity is also part of the price of the vehicle under the
U.C.C.89
The problem with reading these statutes together is that the MVRISA and
TILA do not define ―purchase money security interest,‖ which is the term at
issue. Instead, the courts look to these other statutes for guidance on the term
―price‖ as used in the U.C.C. In fact, the statutes that the courts look to do not
even define the term ―price.‖ The New York Court of Appeals noted that
―New York has defined ‗price‘ in its Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales
Act . . . to include negative equity.‖90 But the New York legislature defined
―cash sale price‖—as most state RISA statutes do—it did not define ―price.‖91
The Eighth Circuit‘s reason for reading Missouri‘s Motor Vehicle Time
Sales Act (MVTSA) in conjunction with Missouri‘s U.C.C. is even more
questionable. First, the court found that ―Article 9 and MVTSA both relate to
the installment financing of motor vehicles, and should be read in pari
materia.‖92 Yet the Missouri U.C.C. contains no rules regarding installment
sales or motor vehicles. The court went on to compare the term ―price‖ in the
U.C.C. with the terms ―cash sale price‖ and ―time sale price‖ in the MVTSA.
It held that because the Missouri legislature had defined ―cash sale price‖ to
mean literally that—the price at which the vehicle would have been sold for
cash—and the legislature defined ―time sale price‖ to include ―other benefits,‖
the legislature must have meant to equate price in the U.C.C. with time sale
price in the MVTSA.93
The TILA regulations do not use the term ―price‖ either. Instead, they use
the terms ―amount financed‖ and ―total sale price.‖94 Indeed, TILA does not
even apply to business transactions.95 U.C.C. section 9-103 applies to all
transactions, and the courts using in pari materia to compare TILA and the
U.C.C. are defining the term ―price‖ in a statute that applies to businesses and

89. Id.
90. Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 913 N.E.2d 387, 390 (N.Y. 2009).
91. N.Y. PERS. PROP. § 301(6) (Consol. Supp. 2009).
92. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 2009).
93. Id.
94. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.18(b), 226.18(j) (2010). Comparing ―price‖ in the TILA regulations to
―price‖ in the U.C.C. is further complicated by the fact that one is a federal law and the other is a
state law. In dissenting from the Tenth Circuit‘s opinion, Judge Tymkovich noted that ―the manner
in which a federal agency has interpreted the term ‗price‘ in a federal statute sheds little light on what
[a state] legislature meant when it employed the term in its version of the U.C.C.‖ Ford v. Ford
Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1292 (10th Cir. 2009).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(1) (2006). Justice Smith of the New York Court of Appeals expressed
his concern that the majority‘s interpretation of PMSI to include negative equity would have a
detrimental impact on the priority scheme set out by the New York U.C.C. In re Peaslee, 913
N.E.2d at 393 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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consumers alike using another statute that applies only to consumers.96
Even if the U.C.C., TILA, and state RISA statutes all used the exact same
term, the U.C.C. has a very different purpose than the TILA and RISA
statutes. Statutes should be read in pari materia only ―when they relate to the
same person or thing, to the same class of persons or things, or have the same
purpose or object.‖97 Whether the statutes have the same purpose or object is
more important than whether they relate to the same class of persons in
determining if they are so closely related that they should be read together.98
If the same class of persons is affected by statutes having different purposes,
the statutes should not be read in pari materia.99 The Ninth Circuit employed
this rule when it held that it could not read the California Automobile Sales
Finance Act (ASFA) together with the U.C.C. because ―[t]he disclosure
provisions of the ASFA were enacted for a different purpose than the ‗price of
the collateral‘ provision in the U.C.C.‖100
The purpose of Article 9 of the U.C.C. is to provide rules governing the
creation and enforcement of security interests.101 In contrast, the purpose of
TILA is to provide consumers with ―a meaningful disclosure of credit
terms . . . [to prevent] the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the
consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing . . . practices.‖102
Similarly, the purpose of RISA statutes is to allow consumers to make
informed decisions about credit through extensive disclosure.103 The goal of
96. Admittedly, the U.C.C. provides that transactions governed by Article 9 may be subject to
―any applicable rule of law which establishes a different rule for consumers.‖ U.C.C. § 9-201(b)
(2001). But something as fundamental as the price of a piece of collateral should not be subject to
different rules for consumers and for businesses. Courts that read the U.C.C. in pari materia with
consumer statutes would then allow negative equity to form the basis of a PMSI when a consumer
purchases a motor vehicle but not when a business purchases a motor vehicle.
97. 2B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 65, § 51:3, at 235–37.
98. Id. § 51:3, at 240–41. The definition of in pari materia in Black‘s Law Dictionary only
includes subject matter. The dictionary defines ―in pari materia‖ as ―[o]n the same subject; relating
to the same matter. It is a canon of construction that statutes that are in pari materia may be
construed together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another
statute on the same subject.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 862 (9th ed. 2009).
99. 2B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 65, § 51:3, at 247; see also Nashville, Chattanooga &
St. Louis Ry. v. Ry. Employees‘ Dep‘t of Am. Fed‘n of Labor, 93 F.2d 340, 343 (6th Cir. 1937)
(―[W]e know of no rule of statutory construction which requires two acts relating to separate and
distinct subjects to be read in pari materia, even though they affect the same general class of
persons.‖) (emphasis added). For example, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act
are not to be read in pari materia. United States v. Papercraft Corp., 540 F.2d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 1976).
100. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), No. 08-60037, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14588, at *12 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010).
101. See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 1 (2001).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006); see also In re Loos, 189 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1995)
(―The purpose of TILA is to promote the informed use of credit by consumers.‖).
103. See, e.g., 69 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 602(d) (West 2004) (―[I]t is hereby declared to be
the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . to [ensure] honest and efficient consumer credit
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both TILA and RISA statutes is to protect consumers, whereas the goal of
Article 9 of the U.C.C. is to protect the rights of creditors.104 Moreover, even
assuming that the U.C.C. relates to the same subject as TILA and RISA
statutes, the in pari materia doctrine allows an inference that the legislature‘s
failure to include negative equity in the U.C.C. definition of ―price‖ when it
was already included in ―cash sale price‖ in the RISA statute was
deliberate.105 Comparing the U.C.C. to TILA and RISA statutes is like
comparing the rules regarding how to make a baseball with the rules regarding
how to play the game of baseball. While the two may use the same term, they
cover two very different subjects.
2. Value Given to Enable
The circuit courts further suggest that the financing of negative equity is
―value given to enable‖ the debtor to acquire rights in the new car.106 Without
paying off the negative equity on the trade-in, the debtor would not have been
able to purchase the car. The Fourth Circuit looked to the dictionary
definition of the term ―enable,‖ finding that it means ―to make possible.‖107
The court concluded that the negative equity enabled the purchase of the new
vehicle because it was integral to the whole transaction.108 Car dealers are
unwilling to accept a trade-in with a lien still attached, so the negative equity
on the trade-in must be extinguished for the transaction on the new car to
move forward.109 The court found that the negative equity enabled the
transaction because ―it allow[ed] the purchaser to utilize the value of the
trade-in.‖110
service for installment purchasers of motor vehicles . . . .‖).
104. Only one circuit that discussed the in pari materia argument has rejected it. The Seventh
Circuit held that the Illinois RISA is ―a consumer-protection statute, intended to require disclosure of
the charges that make up the total price that a consumer pays for the car, rather than to prescribe what
is and is not included in the purchase money security interest.‖ Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs.
(In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 2010).
105. 2B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 65, § 51:2, at 225–28.
106. Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 505 (6th Cir. 2010); In re
Howard, 597 F.3d at 857–58; Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 585 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2009);
Dale v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2009); Wells Fargo Fin.
Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 625 (4th Cir. 2009).
The Ninth Circuit refused to consider this prong of the definition of PMSI, finding that the ―value
given to enable‖ prong applied only when the transaction was financed by a third-party lender at the
outset. The dealership (which was the seller of the collateral) had initially financed the automobile and
sold the loan to AmeriCredit. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), No. 08-60037,
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14588, at *15–16 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010).
107. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 625 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
108. Id.
109. Id. Indeed, in some states it is a felony for a car dealer to accept a trade-in without paying
off the outstanding loan. See, e.g., In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 571 n.3 (citing Texas statute).
110. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 627.
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Furthermore, courts have found that it would be logistically impossible for
the debtor to complete the purchase of the new car without trading in the old
one. For example, the In re Weiser court placed much emphasis on Lisa‘s
testimony that she would not have qualified for a loan to buy the Pontiac
unless she traded in, and paid off the loan on, the RAV4.111
The circuit courts have rejected debtors‘ arguments that the financing of
negative equity enabled the transaction, rather than enabled the debtor to
acquire rights in the vehicle. In In re Price, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that
―[i]f negative equity financing enabled the transaction in which the new car
was acquired, then, in reality, the negative equity financing also enabled the
acquisition of rights in the new car.‖112 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in In re
Westfall found that ―[t]he portion attributable to negative equity played an
integral role in the overall transaction.‖113 The negative equity financing
enabled the debtors to acquire rights in the new car because the ―[d]ebtors
incurred the entire obligation at the same time for the singular purpose of
acquiring the new vehicle.‖114
The circuit courts are reading the U.C.C. much too broadly. While it is
true that paying off the loan on the debtor‘s trade-in car does enable her to
buy the new car by freeing up some cash, it does not enable the debtor to buy
the new car in the same way that the money for the sticker price of the new
car does. The circuit courts reason that the debtor needs to pay off the old car
in order to trade it in for the new car, and to do so she needs to pay off the
negative equity on the old car.115 While Lisa was financially unable to afford
two cars at the same time, she was not required to trade in the RAV4 in order
to acquire rights in the Pontiac.116 The money the new creditor gives the
debtor to pay off the old creditor ―is value that enables the debtor to pay off
his or her existing car lender. It is not value that enables the debtor to buy the
new car.‖117 The value given for the negative equity enables the car dealer to
take the trade-in, it does not enable the car dealer to make the sale.
Further, the courts have needlessly confused enabling the transaction with
enabling the debtor to acquire rights in the vehicle. According to the Fourth
111. In re Weiser, 381 B.R. 263, 268 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2007).
112. Price, 562 F.3d at 625.
113. Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 505 (6th Cir. 2010).
114. Id.
115. In re Weiser, 381 B.R. at 267–68; see also In re Price, 562 F.3d at 627 (―[T]ransactions
involving items other than automobiles would present very different circumstances from the ones
before us here.‖).
116. See Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1289 (10th Cir. 2009)
(Tymkovich, J., dissenting). Judge Tymkovich noted that decisions to finance the negative equity on
a trade-in depend on the individual circumstances of each debtor. Id.
117. Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Debtors Position Seeking Affirmance in Part at 13,
In re Price, 562 F.3d 618 (No. 07-2185), 2008 WL 2307405 (emphasis added).
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and Tenth Circuits, ―‗[f]rom a practical perspective, that distinction is
meaningless.‘‖118 But the distinction is incredibly meaningful, because the
U.C.C. allows a PMSI only for ―value given to enable the debtor to acquire
rights in or the use of the collateral.‖119 The U.C.C. does provide that a debtor
incurs a purchase money obligation for all expenses that enable the debtor to
complete the transaction with the creditor. Courts should be focused on only
the expenses that allow the debtor to acquire rights in the new vehicle.
Financing negative equity does not allow the debtor to acquire rights in the
new vehicle. Negative equity is a value given to the debtor to allow her to
trade in her old vehicle before she purchases a new one. The new creditor
must finance the negative equity only in the sense that someone needs to pay
the dealer the negative equity balance so that the dealer can pay the loan on
the old vehicle, otherwise the dealer could not take the trade-in.
3. Close Nexus
Comment 3 to section 9-103 of the U.C.C. is also clear that a ―close
nexus‖ must exist between the ―acquisition of collateral and the secured
obligation.‖120 The circuit courts have invariably held that the new lender‘s
financing of the negative equity has a sufficiently close nexus with the
acquisition of the collateral.121 They reason that the close nexus requirement
is satisfied because all components of the new loan are part of a single
transaction memorialized on a single document.122 The financing of the
negative equity would not take place without the purchase of the new car, so
the deal is, in essence, a ―‗package deal.‘‖123 The Tenth Circuit found that the
trade-in transaction is essentially a ―swap,‖ and that the additional financing
of negative equity ―should not turn the swap into two separate
transactions.‖124 According to the Fourth Circuit, the trade-in is a single
transaction, and negative equity is simply an expense incurred in the
transaction.125
This approach favors the form over the substance of the transaction. The
debtor did not simply trade one car for another and in the process incur more
debt. The new car dealer purchased the old car from the debtor and the debtor
118. In re Westfall, 599 F.3d at 505 (quoting In re Price, 562 F.3d at 625).
119. U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2) (2001).
120. U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3.
121. In re Westfall, 599 F.3d at 505; Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski),
580 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 2009); In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1285; In re Price, 562 F.3d at 627;
Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2008).
122. In re Westfall, 599 F.3d at 505; In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1284–85.
123. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir.
2009) (quoting In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1302); In re Price, 562 F.3d at 625 (same).
124. In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1285.
125. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 627.
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purchased a new car from the dealer, resulting in two separate transactions. It
should not matter that the transactions were memorialized in a single contract.
In contrast to the other circuits, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the creditor‘s
―package deal‖ argument, holding that a PMSI does not arise simply because
two types of debt are memorialized on a single document.126
When the dealer purchased the old car from the debtor, it paid the debtor a
certain purchase price. In Lisa‘s case, Van Chevrolet paid $21,000 for Lisa‘s
Toyota. It is true that Lisa still owed Toyota Motor Finance $9,031.64 after
the purchase, but Lisa could have paid this remaining balance in any number
of ways. For instance, she could have paid cash or she could have paid the
balance using her credit card. Instead, she chose to finance that amount with
Van Chevrolet at the same time she purchased a new car. That choice does
not transform what are essentially two transactions into a single transaction,
regardless of whether they are memorialized in a single document.
The majority of the circuit courts seem to disregard the fact that the rolling
of negative equity into the new loan is essentially a refinance.127 The 2001
revision to the U.C.C. clarified that a PMSI that is refinanced retains its
character as a PMSI for non-consumer goods transactions.128 Subsection (h)
leaves it to the courts to determine whether to apply the same rule for
consumer goods.129 The comments are clear, however, that if additional funds
beyond the original purchase price are loaned in the refinance transaction, the
new loan is a PMSI only to the extent of the amount of the original purchase
price that was refinanced.130
Moreover, negative equity is essentially antecedent debt.131 Case law
construing PMSI in light of § 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code makes clear that
any antecedent debt financed in a purchase money transaction cannot form the
basis of a PMSI.132 The debtor incurred the obligation to pay before the
126. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), No. 08-60037, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14588, at *10 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010).
127. In re Penrod, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14588, at *9 (―[Negative equity] is the payment of
an antecedent debt, not an expense incurred in buying the new vehicle.‖); see also Reiber v. GMAC,
LLC (In re Peaslee), 913 N.E.2d 387, 391 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J., dissenting) (―A refinanced loan is
not, in accounting terms, properly speaking, an ‗expense‘ at all; it is the substitution of a new liability
for an old one.‖).
128. U.C.C. § 9-103(f)(3) (2001).
129. Id. § 9-103(h). Eight states have chosen to eliminate the consumer/non-consumer goods
distinction, see infra note 190, so a refinance would not destroy the PMSI for a consumer goods
transaction.
130. U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 7a. The comment indicates that if the remaining $10,000 on a PMSI
loan were refinanced along with an additional $2,000, the $2,000 would not be a PMSI. Id.
131. Black‘s Law Dictionary defines ―antecedent‖ as ―preexisting.‖
BLACK‘S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 98, at 107.
132. See, e.g., Matthews v. Transamerica Fin. Servs. (In re Matthews), 724 F.2d 798, 800–01
(9th Cir. 1984); see also U.C.C. § 9-107 cmt. 2 (1972).
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transaction to purchase the new car was entered into, so the negative equity is
a preexisting debt. The Eastern District of Michigan concluded in In re
Muldrew that the negative equity was part of the ―bargained-for total cash
price of the new vehicle.‖133 This conclusion mischaracterizes the negative
equity. Even if the price of the new car was higher or lower due to the
inclusion of negative equity, the fact is not changed that the debtor had an
obligation to pay the negative equity amount before she ever walked into the
car dealership. That obligation is not sufficiently related to the new car
purchase to satisfy the close nexus requirement.
Further, the vehicle does not secure money required to make the purchase.
Judge Bye of the Eighth Circuit noted that when a debtor takes out a general
loan and pledges his vehicle as security, the creditor has a security interest in
the vehicle, just not a PMSI.134 ―The close association which financing
negative equity has to many vehicle sales transactions is not enough to satisfy
the close nexus test, because negative equity is not causally related to the
price of the new vehicle.‖135 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found that while the
financing of negative equity was in fact connected to the purchase of the
vehicle, it was not ―sufficiently connected‖ to allow a PMSI.136
The circuit courts also place emphasis on the fact that the debtor is trading
in an old car for a new car.137 Some even acknowledge that had the debtor
asked for funds to pay off her credit cards or go on a vacation, that portion of
the loan on the new car would not be purchase money.138 But it should not
matter that the debtor traded in one type of good for a new one of the same
type. What would happen if the debtor traded in a motorcycle? Or an RV?
Or a golf cart? Or a bicycle? Those are all vehicles that could serve as the
debtor‘s primary mode of transportation, but the circuit courts would surely
agree that any negative equity in those items that was financed by the new car
lender would not be a PMSI.139

133. Nuvell Credit Co. v. Muldrew (In re Muldrew), 396 B.R. 915, 926 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
134. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 744 (8th Cir.
2009) (Bye, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 747.
136. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), No. 08-60037, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14588, at *9 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010).
137. See Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1285–86 (10th Cir.
2009); Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 627 (4th Cir. 2009).
138. See In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1285–86; In re Price, 562 F.3d at 627.
139. One court questioned whether the cost of an emergency appendectomy might be covered
as a PMSI under the prevailing PMSI interpretation, assuming that the debtor would not have made it
to the car dealer‘s lot without it. In re Westfall, 365 B.R. 755, 762 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007); see
also In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1286 (―An automobile dealer who attempted to refinance unrelated
antecedent debt and secure the new debt with the new car would present a question wholly different
from the question presented here.‖).
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The courts are also hung up on the fact that a debtor does not retain
possession of the trade-in. In In re Vega, the debtors still owed a little over
$2,000 on a Kia when they decided to purchase a Dodge Intrepid.140 The
creditor agreed to roll the remaining $2,000 into the loan for the Dodge and
release its security interest in the Kia, but the debtors kept the Kia.141 The
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas refused to accord purchase
money status to the $2,000 the creditor rolled into the new loan because the
amount did not make it possible for the debtors to acquire rights in the
Intrepid.142 The Tenth Circuit cited In re Vega as an example of unrelated
antecedent debt, but it provided no explanation for why the result should be
different whether the debtor keeps the old car or gives it to the dealer.143 In
both circumstances the creditor is extinguishing a preexisting security interest
on a vehicle in which it has absolutely no interest.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the notion that debt from a source other than
negative equity on a trade-in would ever be present in a car loan.144 ―The
Prices present no comparable reason why people would fold their credit card
or other debts into the purchase of a car, or why car dealers or lenders would
be eager to permit them to do so.‖145 But it is not hard to imagine an eager car
dealer wanting to help a debtor qualify for a car loan by paying off her
overdue credit card balance. The Fourth Circuit seems to acknowledge that
the credit card balance would not be a PMSI without providing any
explanation why a balance on the trade-in car is any different than the credit
card balance.
The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that its holding extended only to
―reasonable, bona fide negative equity in the trade-in vehicle.‖146 The court
stated that the result might be different if ―there is evidence of subterfuge
relating to an unrelated antecedent debt.‖147 The Eleventh Circuit failed to
explain, however, what would constitute an ―unrelated antecedent debt.‖
Let‘s imagine that a debtor owned her vehicle free and clear of any liens.
She then borrowed money to take a vacation and granted the lender a security
interest in the vehicle. A year later the debtor decides to trade in the vehicle

140. In re Vega, 344 B.R. 616, 617–18 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 623.
143. In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1286; see also In re Myers, 393 B.R. 616, 622 (Bankr. S.D. Ind.
2008) (―Had the Debtor here kept the Jeep Wrangler, the Court would have reached a different result,
for the part of the loan that was used to pay off the Jeep Wrangler did not enable the Debtor to
acquire rights in the Caliber, it merely paid off an existing debt on the Wrangler.‖)
144. Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 627 (4th Cir. 2009).
145. Id.
146. Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1303 n.5 (11th Cir. 2008).
147. Id.
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for a new one, but the debtor owes more on the vacation loan than the value of
her car. The dealership agrees to allow the debtor to wrap the negative equity
into her new loan. The question is whether the circuit courts would agree that
the negative equity in this case—from an entirely unrelated loan used to take a
vacation—is not purchase money. The Eleventh Circuit‘s statement seems to
indicate that the court would not consider the negative equity in that situation
to be purchase money. So why do the courts consider negative equity from
loans like the one in Lisa‘s case to be purchase money and thus closely related
to the purchase of the new collateral? Negative equity does not have a ―close
nexus‖ to the purchase of a new car simply because the negative equity
originated from the purchase of another car.
4. Commercial Practices
Finally, many of the circuit courts reason that allowing negative equity to
be a PMSI accords with the goals of the U.C.C.148 Section 1-103 states that
the U.C.C. ―must be liberally construed . . . to promote its underlying
purposes and policies, which [include] . . . [permitting] the continued
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of
the parties.‖149 The financing of negative equity in new car purchase
transactions has become commonplace,150 but it is not necessarily a practice
that should be promoted and encouraged.151 The bankruptcy court in In re
Pajot suggested that the inclusion of negative equity in a new car loan is
imprudent borrowing and imprudent lending.152 And Judge Bye of the Eighth
Circuit noted that commercial practices cannot change the character of the
negative equity debt: ―Negative equity is an antecedent unsecured debt and
cannot be transformed into a purchase money obligation secured by a PMSI
by rolling it into the loan [for the vehicle].‖153 Moreover, the drafters of the
2001 revision to the U.C.C. were likely aware of the practice and deliberately
chose not to include negative equity in the list of examples in Comment 3 to
section 9-103.154

148. Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2010);
Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 585 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Price, 562 F.3d at 627–28.
149. U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2001).
150. One study found that nearly 40% of all new car buyers have negative equity on their
trade-in. Danny Hakim, Owing More on an Auto than It’s Worth as a Trade-In, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 2004, at C1.
151. See In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 165 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007). Chief Judge Tice also
suggested that such unsound financial practices contribute to the reasons that debtors end up in his
courtroom. Id.
152. Id.
153. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 746 (8th Cir.
2009) (Bye, J., dissenting).
154. In 2001, approximately one in four new car buyers had negative equity on their trade-in.
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B. Congressional Intent
Though unnecessary, the circuit courts have often looked to congressional
intent to discern the meaning of ―purchase money security interest.‖ With
regard to the hanging paragraph, there is no doubt that ―Congress was
attempting to remedy a perceived abuse by those who buy vehicles on credit
on the eve of bankruptcy and then utilize the cramdown provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code to pay the secured creditor a lesser amount than its full
claim.‖155 Thus, the court in In re Petrocci concluded that the ―primary
purpose‖ of the hanging paragraph is to disallow bifurcation of unsecured
negative equity debt, requiring the car creditor to be ―paid in full to the
detriment of other unsecured creditors.‖156
But looking to federal congressional intent in enacting the hanging
paragraph ignores several important issues. First, by using a term defined in
the U.C.C., Congress cannot alter the meaning of the term without providing a
specific definition of the term in the Bankruptcy Code. Second, the hanging
paragraph represents a compromise between car creditors and credit card
creditors because the new ―means test‖ would force more consumer debtors
into Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which is more favorable for
car creditors. Third, the hanging paragraph protects the unique position of the
car lender, whose collateral rapidly depreciates the moment the debtor takes
possession. Finally, such a liberal reading of the hanging paragraph is not
compatible with fundamental bankruptcy policy.
1. Congress Cannot Alter the Meaning of PMSI
First and foremost, federal legislative history seems largely irrelevant to
the negative equity question. As I noted above, a PMSI is a property right
that is defined by state law—and state law alone—unless Congress alters it.157
The plain language of the hanging paragraph suggests that those attempting to
interpret the meaning of ―purchase money security interest‖ should proceed
directly to state law because Congress provided no separate definition for the
term in the Bankruptcy Code. Congress used a term that already had a
defined meaning outside the Bankruptcy Code, and, more importantly, that
term involves a specific property interest, which is almost always a matter of
state law. Thus, courts should be interpreting the phrase as a matter of state
law—congressional intent regarding the phrase is irrelevant, unless Congress
meant to redefine the scope of a PMSI.
The circuit courts looking to congressional intent have concluded that
See Hakim, supra note 150.
155. In re Payne, 347 B.R. 278, 281 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006).
156. In re Petrocci, 370 B.R. 489, 502 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2007).
157. See supra Part II.C.
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Congress intended that PMSI have a broad meaning in the hanging paragraph.
They arrive at this conclusion by noting that the section of the BAPCPA that
includes the hanging paragraph is titled ―Giving Secured Creditors Fair
Treatment in Chapter 13.‖158 In addition, the subsection containing the
language for the hanging paragraph begins with the phrase ―Restoring the
Foundation for Secured Credit.‖159 Because of the new protections offered by
the hanging paragraph, the courts reason that Congress could have meant only
good things for creditors.160 While Congress may have intended only good
things for creditors, congressional intent did not explicitly expand the
definition of PMSI beyond the state law meaning of the term.161
To date, no court has attempted to discern the intent of the U.C.C. drafters
regarding the breadth of a PMSI. Furthermore, none have attempted to
examine state legislative history. If the scope of PMSI is murky enough to
examine legislative history, courts should be examining state legislative
history (and U.C.C. drafting history), not federal legislative history. Federal
legislative history could be used to discern whether Congress intended to
follow the state law rule for PMSI or create a federal rule. But it is hard to
understand why the circuit courts rely on the U.C.C. and state law in
concluding that negative equity can be part of a PMSI while at the same time
concluding that the result is supported by federal legislative history.
2. The Hanging Paragraph Compromise
The most fundamental change in existing bankruptcy policy introduced by
the BAPCPA was the ―means test‖ for Chapter 7 debtors.162 The vast
majority of consumer debtors will choose between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
bankruptcy. In Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a debtor without significant assets can
have most of his debts discharged and come out of bankruptcy relatively
unscathed within six to nine months. In Chapter 13, however, the debtor must
pay a portion of his income to his creditors every month for either three or
158. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 306, 119 Stat. 23, 80.
159. Id. § 306(b).
160. Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2008).
The courts must make inferences regarding Congress‘s intent because the legislative history
regarding the hanging paragraph is sparse. See In re Hayes, 376 B.R. 655 add. at 676–84 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 2007), for a complete legislative history of the paragraph. Judge Lundin‘s overview
includes several versions of the hanging paragraph, but the legislative history does not include any
committee reports or other policy statements that would allow any insight into Congress‘s
motivations. But see William C. Whitford, A History of the Automobile Lender Provisions of
BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 143.
161. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 747 (8th Cir.
2009) (Bye, J., dissenting).
162. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006); Charles J. Tabb & Jillian K. McClelland, Living with the
Means Test, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 463, 505 (2007).

1244

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:1217

five years. The means test forces debtors with the ability to sustain a payment
plan into Chapter 13. The credit card creditors and other unsecured creditors
obtain a better return in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy because at least a portion of
the debt will be repaid through the life of the Chapter 13 plan.
Car creditors did not fare as well in Chapter 13 before BAPCPA. If a
Chapter 7 debtor wants to retain possession of a car that is not paid off, he has
three options: (1) redeem the car by paying the full amount due on the loan;
(2) surrender the car, which would allow the creditor to sell the car, apply the
proceeds to the outstanding balance, and file an unsecured claim for the
remainder; or (3) reaffirm the debt.163 Most debtors are unable to redeem the
car by paying in full (else why would they be in Chapter 7?), nor do they want
to surrender their car to the creditor to pay the debt, so most debtors sign a
reaffirmation agreement. The reaffirmation agreement commonly provides
that the debtor will repay the entire amount owing, with interest, so the car
creditor emerges from the debtor‘s bankruptcy in relatively the same position
it was in prior to the bankruptcy.164 In contrast, prior to BAPCPA, the
Chapter 13 car creditor could expect to take a big hit due to the debtor‘s
ability to cram down the loan.165 The creditor would receive the market value
of the collateral plus pennies on the dollar for the remaining unsecured
deficiency.166
Because the means test was going to force many more potential Chapter 7
debtors into Chapter 13, the car creditors could expect to lose a lot of money
on crammed-down loans.167 At the behest of the car creditors, Senator
Spencer Abraham from Michigan introduced the hanging paragraph during a
meeting of the Senate Judiciary Committee.168
Surprisingly, the amendment prompted little public criticism from credit
card issuers or other large groups of unsecured creditors.169 The credit card
163. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2). Prior to BAPCPA, the debtor had a fourth option: do nothing. If
the debtor was current on her payments, the car loan would quietly ―ride-through‖ the bankruptcy
without change. Braucher, supra note 33, at 475–77. The ride-through option was rejected by many
courts, however, and some creditors did not like it because, while the creditor retained a lien on the
vehicle, the debtor‘s personal obligation to pay was discharged in the bankruptcy. Whitford, supra
note 160, at 148–49. The continued validity of this fourth option after BAPCPA remains to be seen.
See Christopher M. Hogan, Note, Will the Ride-Through Ride Again?, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 882,
925–26 (2008) (arguing that the ride-through should continue as a viable option post-BAPCPA).
164. Whitford, supra note 160, at 144–46. The car creditor has superior bargaining power in
negotiating reaffirmation agreements because the debtor will not be able to easily replace her car if
she surrenders it to the car creditor due to her impaired credit rating. Id. at 145.
165. Id. at 145–46.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 146.
168. Id. at 177. Though many expected some sort of protection for car creditors in Chapter 13,
the amendment was not circulated before the meeting and was introduced as a surprise. Id. at 178.
169. Id. at 178–79.
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issuers must have realized that they would not be able to force so many more
debtors into Chapter 13 without giving some sort of consolation to car
creditors. The hanging paragraph must be seen for what it is—a compromise
between car creditors and unsecured creditors. Increasing the amount of a
secured debt that a debtor must pay through her Chapter 13 plan means that
less of the debtor‘s funds will be available to pay unsecured creditors through
the plan. If the unsecured creditors had known that the car creditors would
use the hanging paragraph to substantially increase the amount of their
secured claims (by almost 50% in Lisa Weiser‘s case), they might have fought
harder to clarify the narrow meaning of ―purchase money security interest.‖
In his dissent from the Tenth Circuit‘s opinion, Judge Tymkovich noted
that ―purchase money security interest‖ did not appear in early versions of the
hanging paragraph.170 One early bill would have protected only the ―unpaid
balance of the purchase price‖ from cramdown, while another would have
protected ―an allowed claim that is secured under applicable non-bankruptcy
law.‖171 The former would protect only the sticker price of the car, and the
latter would protect the car creditor‘s entire claim, including negative equity.
The language that Congress ultimately settled on represents a compromise and
suggests that Congress did not intend to protect from cramdown every dollar
of a car creditor‘s claim.
The Fourth Circuit worried that excluding negative equity from the car
creditors‘ secured claims ―would nullify the treatment that Congress intended
for a large percentage of vehicle debts.‖172 But the court misconstrued the
effect of holding that negative equity cannot form the basis of a PMSI. Even
if negative equity is not a PMSI, the creditor still has a PMSI for the rest of
the purchase price. Only the negative equity portion will be ―stripped‖ off of
the lien. Congress‘s intent in protecting car creditors will still be realized by
protecting their interest to the extent of the purchase price of the car.173
3. The Unique Position of Car Creditors
Car lenders are unique among secured creditors. Their collateral
decreases in value significantly the moment the borrower takes possession.174
170. See Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1293–94 (10th Cir.
2009) (Tymkovich, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 1293 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
172. Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 628 (4th Cir. 2009).
173. Judge Tymkovich indicated that use of the term ―purchase money security interest‖
―might have reflected a Congressional compromise to protect certain fees that are properly
considered part of a purchase-money loan—i.e., fees akin to transaction costs—and not to protect
negative equity.‖ In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1293–94.
174. See William C. Wood, The Cost of Driving a Car Off the Dealer’s Lot, 28 J. CONSUMER
AFF. 130, 130 (1994). Wood notes that a car‘s value can decrease by as much as 25% as soon as the
buyer takes possession. Id.
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Prior to BAPCPA, a debtor could buy a brand-new car one day and file
bankruptcy the next. The debtor then would be able to cram down the car
loan to the value of the car and realize thousands of dollars in savings on the
loan. Congress enacted the hanging paragraph to prevent this sort of ―abuse[]
created by spendthrift debtors.‖175 But there is a big difference between a
―normal‖ car loan and one that includes negative equity in the financing: the
car financed with a loan that includes negative equity is ―underwater‖ even
before the borrower drives it off the lot. In Lisa‘s case, the Pontiac‘s sticker
price was around $14,000, but it carried a debt of over $26,000 before she
even drove away with it.176 Certainly Congress could not have meant to
protect a lender that is undersecured before the buyer takes possession.
A provision similar to the hanging paragraph prohibits modification of a
mortgage on the debtor‘s principal residence.177 As a result of the recent
downturn in housing prices, many homes are now worth less than the
mortgages they secure.178 In light of the situation, several members of
Congress proposed bills that would allow homeowners in Chapter 13 to cram
down their home mortgages to the value of the home.179 As of this writing, the
mortgage industry has been successful in its opposition to these bills. But the
fact that many members of Congress are sympathetic to these underwater home
mortgages signifies that Congress did not intend only good things for creditors.
Unlike mortgage creditors, car creditors expect their collateral to
depreciate rather than appreciate. Car creditors do not extend a loan that
includes negative equity expecting that the automobile will appreciate in value
and the creditor will become fully secured. Rather, the value of the
automobile is expected to depreciate over the life of the loan. While the
creditor does technically have a security interest for the entire amount of the

175. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Peaslee, 373 B.R. 252, 261 (W.D.N.Y. 2007).
176. Admittedly, the potential for abuse still exists if negative equity is not a PMSI and thus not
protected by the hanging paragraph. Under my approach to negative equity, Lisa could have
discharged as unsecured debt over $9,000 of negative equity if she filed bankruptcy the day after she
purchased the Pontiac. By crying ―abuse,‖ however, the creditors escape liability for making such a
bad loan. The car dealer financed such a large amount of negative equity that it represented over
70% of the Pontiac‘s value. Creditors making such risky loans should not be protected by placing
the blame on the debtors. If Community America had repossessed the Pontiac, and sued Lisa for the
deficiency before Lisa filed for bankruptcy, all of that negative equity would be an unsecured (and
therefore dischargeable) claim.
177. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006).
178. David Roeder & Francine Knowles, Read ’em—and Weep: Collapse in Housing Market
Leaves Many Who Bought in Last 2 Years Owing More Than Property Worth, CHI. SUN TIMES, Aug.
12, 2008, at 2 (noting that by 2008, 37.8% of Chicago-area homeowners who purchased homes in
2006 owed more than their homes were worth).
179. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
(2009); Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, H.R. 1106, 111th Cong. (2009); Helping
Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2008, S. 2136, 110th Cong. (2007).
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loan, the creditor is rarely fully secured. For most of the life of the loan, the
balance due on the loan will be more than the value of the collateral.
This is a risky position for the car creditor. If the debtor defaults without
filing bankruptcy, the creditor will not be paid in full after foreclosing on its
collateral and must turn to the debtor—who has already defaulted—for payment
of the unsecured deficiency amount. When the creditor cannot collect the
deficiency, it is forced to write off the bad debt. The precarious position of the
car creditor is only enhanced by inclusion of negative equity in a car loan.
4. Bankruptcy Policy
The PMSI interpretation of the hanging paragraph is not compatible with
bankruptcy policy. Bankruptcy proceedings serve two purposes: they provide
troubled debtors with a ―fresh start,‖ and they treat all similarly situated
creditors equally when distributing a bankrupt‘s assets.180
In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, debtors can pay off their secured debt, pay a
percentage of their unsecured debt, and have most of the remaining debts
discharged. If Chapter 13 debtors are required to pay the full amount due on
their car loans, including the negative equity, they will be prevented from
obtaining the fresh start that a bankruptcy filing is supposed to give them.181
Instead, a monthly car payment that includes the negative equity balance may
be so high that the debtor is forced to surrender the car. The Fourth Circuit
asserted that any argument that Chapter 13 debtors would be forced to
surrender their cars if they cannot bifurcate the negative equity is ―necessarily
speculative.‖182 Nevertheless, after Judge Federman ruled that the over
$9,000 in negative equity had to be paid through her Chapter 13 plan, Lisa
Weiser was forced to surrender her car.183
180. See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
BANKRUPTCY UNDER THE ACT OF CONGRESS OF 1898 AND ITS AMENDMENTS § 3, at 7 (The
Lawbook Exchange 3d ed. 2006) (1922); see also DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY
(INCLUDING BAPCPA): 21ST CENTURY DEBTOR–CREDITOR LAW 41–42 (2d ed. 2006).
181. The phrase ―fresh start‖ does not appear in the bankruptcy code; ―[c]ourts and
commentators however consistently connect the bankruptcy ‗fresh start‘ policy with the bankruptcy
discharge.‖ EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 180, at 42; see also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87
(1991) (noting that the policy behind bankruptcy is to provide a ―fresh start‖ for the ―honest but
unfortunate debtor‖) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
182. Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 629 (4th Cir. 2009). To
be fair, the car creditors have their own parade of horribles, arguing that not including negative
equity in PMSI will make it harder for consumers to buy cars because lenders will be resistant to
financing negative equity. Id.
183. In re Weiser, 381 B.R. 263, 265 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2007); Amendment to Chapter 13 Plan
at 1, In re Weiser, 381 B.R. 263 (No. 07-40714). An issue outside the scope of this Comment is
whether Community America would then receive an unsecured claim in the bankruptcy for the
deficiency amount after it sold the RAV4 and applied the proceeds to the remaining balance. There
is a split in the circuits on this issue, but the Eighth Circuit has ruled that the creditor is allowed to
file an unsecured claim for the deficiency. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. v. Moore, 517 F.3d. 987, 989
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In addition, debtors that cannot afford the higher monthly payment as a
result of the inclusion of negative equity may choose to convert to a Chapter 7
liquidation. Many debtors that may otherwise qualify to file for Chapter 7
bankruptcy under BAPCPA‘s means test file Chapter 13 instead in an effort to
save their house or car.184 This means that unsecured creditors that may have
received a small distribution through a Chapter 13 will likely receive nothing
if the debtor files bankruptcy under Chapter 7.
Furthermore, ―bankruptcy law is not designed to fundamentally alter
property rights. Instead, ‗a bankruptcy proceeding is principally a forum in
which all of a debtor‘s creditors can gather, assemble the debtor‘s assets, and
divide them among themselves.‘‖185 Allowing lenders to recover their full
claim for negative equity using the hanging paragraph will favor the car
lender over other unsecured creditors. The original purpose of the cramdown
provisions of § 506(a) was to allow debt that was essentially unsecured to be
treated that way. A secured creditor whose collateral is worth less than the
outstanding amount owed is really an unsecured creditor with regard to the
deficiency. The hanging paragraph acts against this bankruptcy policy to
allow car creditors to recover what would be unsecured debt in a foreclosure
proceeding.186 A Chapter 13 debtor only has so much income. In most cases
unsecured creditors will receive a very small distribution in the proceedings.
By allowing the car creditor to assert a much larger secured claim than it
would otherwise receive, the other creditors are swindled out of their meager
distributions. The car creditor should not receive a greater distribution than
other unsecured creditors on what is essentially an unsecured claim.
IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE NEGATIVE EQUITY DEBATE
A. Dual Status vs. Transformation Rule
The bankruptcy courts that adopted the non-PMSI interpretation of
(8th Cir. 2008); Capital One Auto Fin. v. Osborn, 515 F.3d 817, 822–23 (8th Cir. 2008). Lisa‘s
Chapter 13 plan provided for a zero percent dividend to unsecured creditors, so even though
Community America was allowed an unsecured claim in Lisa‘s bankruptcy after surrender and sale,
the bank received nothing on the unsecured deficiency amount. The bank therefore recovered much
less than it would have if Lisa had been allowed to cram down the car loan to the sticker price she
paid for the Pontiac and pay Community America‘s secured claim through her Chapter 13 plan.
184. See Susan L. DeJarnatt, Once Is Not Enough: Preserving Consumers’ Rights to
Bankruptcy Protection, 74 IND. L.J. 455, 459–60 (1999).
185. Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 2009)
(Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). See also Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 346 (1874)
(noting that the most important purpose of bankruptcy is equality of distribution).
186. To be sure, the car creditor that finances negative equity and takes a security interest has
that security interest until the debtor pays the last dime of her obligation to the creditor. But when a
creditor is undersecured and the debtor defaults, which is essentially the result in bankruptcy, the
undersecured creditor is left with debt that is unsecured after the value of the collateral is applied to
reduce the debt.
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negative equity are split as to the effect of the presence of the non-PMSI
negative equity portion in the loan. The first group adopts the ―dual status‖
rule, holding that the negative equity portion of the financing is not a PMSI
and is not protected by the hanging paragraph, but the remainder of the
amount due the car lender is purchase money.187 The second adopts the
―transformation‖ rule, holding that the presence of a non-purchase money
component transforms the entire balance into a non-PMSI.188
The U.C.C. provides some guidance on the issue, but only for nonconsumer goods transactions. Section 9-103(f) provides that ―a purchasemoney security interest does not lose its status as such, even if the purchasemoney collateral also secures an obligation that is not a purchase-money
obligation.‖ For consumer goods transactions, the U.C.C. directs the courts to
determine the proper rules.189 Eight states have opted to eliminate the
consumer/non-consumer goods distinction in the U.C.C., applying the dual
status rule to all transactions.190
If the dual status rule is applied, the portion of the debt that originally
qualified as a PMSI, i.e., the portion that represents the purchase price for the
new car, remains as a PMSI to the extent of the purchase price of the collateral
(along with the enumerated expenses in Comment 3).191 The portion of the debt
representing the PMSI is subject to the provisions of the hanging paragraph.192
In Lisa‘s case above, $19,219.60 would represent the PMSI subject to the
provisions of the hanging paragraph.193 The negative equity of $9,031.64

187. See, e.g., Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 860 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2008), aff’d by AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), No. 08-60037, 2010
U.S. App. LEXIS 14588 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010) (circuit court did not reach the dual status question);
Nuvell Credit Co. v. Callicott (In re Callicott), 396 B.R. 506, 510 (E.D. Mo. 2008); Citifinancial
Auto v. Hernandez-Simpson, 369 B.R. 36, 48 (D. Kan. 2007); In re Crawford, 397 B.R. 461, 468
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008); In re Johnson, 380 B.R. 236, 250 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007); In re Hayes, 376
B.R. 655, 676 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007); In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 165 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007);
In re Acaya, 369 B.R. 564, 571 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007); In re Vega, 344 B.R. 616, 623 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 2006).
188. See, e.g., In re Mitchell, 379 B.R. 131, 142 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007); In re Blakeslee,
377 B.R. 724, 731 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007); In re Hunt, No. 07-20627, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2709, at
*7 (Bankr. D. Kan. Aug. 14, 2007); In re Price, 363 B.R. 734, 746 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007).
189. U.C.C. § 9-103(h) (2001).
190. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.1031(6) (West 2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-9-103(f) (2001);
IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9.1-103(f) (LexisNexis 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-103(f) (Supp.
2008); MD. CODE. ANN., COM. LAW. § 9-103(f) (LexisNexis 2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-103(f)
(2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-03(6) (Supp. 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-9-103(f) (2004).
These statutes eliminate the phrase ―other than a consumer-goods transaction‖ appearing in
sections 9-103(e), (f), and (g), as well as the consumer goods caveat in section 9-103(h).
191. In re Acaya, 369 B.R. at 570.
192. Id. at 571.
193. Community America‘s claim of $28,251.24 minus $9,031.64 for the negative equity.
Under Comment 3 to U.C.C. section 9-103, the interest charges and costs of collection are a PMSI.
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would be an unsecured claim paid pro rata with the other unsecured claims.
If the transformation rule is applied, the entire amount financed becomes a
non-PMSI.194 Therefore, it does not meet the requirements of the hanging
paragraph and it would be subject to cramdown under § 506(a). In Lisa‘s case,
the Pontiac would be subject to valuation; Community America would receive
a secured claim for the market value of the Pontiac at the time of the filing of
the bankruptcy petition; and the remainder of the claim would be unsecured.
At least one court proposed to exempt a claim including negative equity
from the provisions of the hanging paragraph.195 The theory is that the
hanging paragraph only applies when the entire claim is a PMSI.196 The
hanging paragraph provides that § 506(a) does not apply ―if‖ the claim is a
PMSI, not ―to the extent that‖ the claim is a PMSI.197 If Congress meant to
allow the hanging paragraph to apply to only part of a claim, it would have
used the phrase ―to the extent that‖ because that phrase is used in a number of
other places in the Bankruptcy Code.198 This approach would eviscerate the
hanging paragraph because so many car purchases include negative equity.
The best approach, and the one I advocate below, is to apply the hanging
paragraph to the purchase money portion of the creditor‘s claim.
I believe the dual status rule, rather than the transformation rule, best
harmonizes Congress‘s intent in enacting the hanging paragraph and the
actual status of the creditor‘s security interest. If Lisa had simply surrendered
the Pontiac, instead of filing bankruptcy, Community America would have
had an unsecured claim for the negative equity and any other deficiency
amount owed above the fair market value of the car.199 The hanging
paragraph was enacted to prevent perceived abuses by debtors that purchased
new cars and then filed bankruptcy only a short time later; and in doing so, it
leaves the motor vehicle creditor in a somewhat better position than it would
be outside of bankruptcy. The transformation rule destroys any effect of the
hanging paragraph, which almost certainly defies congressional intent.
The dual status rule is also supported in the text of the U.C.C.
Section 9-103(b)(1) provides that ―a security interest in goods is a purchasemoney security interest to the extent that the goods are purchase-money
collateral with respect to that security interest.‖200 Though Congress did not
use the phrase ―to the extent that‖ in the hanging paragraph, it is in the U.C.C.
U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (2001).
194. In re Price, 363 B.R. 734, 745 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007).
195. See In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 860 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 859–60.
198. Id. at 860.
199. See AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. v. Moore, 517 F.3d. 987, 989 (8th Cir. 2008).
200. U.C.C. § 9-103(b)(1) (2001).
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The use of the phrase suggests that a creditor can have a PMSI and another
security interest in the same collateral. The PMSI extends only as far as the
purchase money component of the security interest. Any further funds
secured by the collateral are not purchase money.
Further, revised Article 9 adopts the dual status rule for non-consumer
goods. Section 9-103(f)(1) provides that ―in a transaction other than a
consumer-goods transaction, a purchase-money security interest does not lose
its status as such, even if the purchase-money collateral also secures an
obligation that is not a purchase-money obligation.‖201 The U.C.C. leaves to
courts the determination of whether to apply the dual status or transformation
rule in consumer goods transactions.202 When they enacted revised Article 9,
several states explicitly adopted the dual status rule for consumer goods
transactions as well as non-consumer goods transactions.203
A bright line dual status rule also best aligns with the realities of a
bankruptcy practice. Some courts have suggested that, in accordance with the
suggestion of section 9-103(h) of the U.C.C., the court should have the
discretion in each case to determine whether the dual status or transformation
rules should apply.204 But a rule that allows discretion is an invitation to
litigation in a forum where the parties can hardly afford to be there in the first
place, much less litigate over which rule to apply.
The Seventh Circuit indicated that the hanging paragraph eliminated what
was, before BAPCPA, a valuation problem for car creditors.205 The
bankruptcy court no longer has to attempt to value the creditor‘s collateral by
simply providing that the entire claim is secured as long as it is a PMSI. The
Seventh Circuit expressed concern that excluding negative equity from the
reach of the hanging paragraph would restore the previous valuation
problems.206 Yet with the dual status rule, the valuation problem is still cured.
The creditor has a PMSI (not subject to cramdown) for the full purchase price
of the car. It is only the negative equity that would be crammed down—the
creditor‘s secured claim still is likely to far exceed the actual value of the
car.207
201. U.C.C. § 9-103(f)(1).
202. U.C.C. § 9-103(h).
203. See supra note 190.
204. In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 157–58 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007).
205. Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 2010).
Section 506(a)(2) provides that the court determines the replacement value of the car when § 506 is
used to bifurcate the loan into secured and unsecured components. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2006). If
the court values the car too low, the creditor is worse off because its claim is undervalued. If the
court values the car too high, the debtor might be encouraged to surrender the car instead of paying
an amount that exceeds the car‘s value. In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 854.
206. In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 858.
207. The Seventh Circuit noted that had the negative equity been stripped from the creditor‘s
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B. Payment Application Considerations
After determining that the negative equity portion of the loan is not a
PMSI, the courts next face the arduous process of determining the amount of
the secured claim that is protected by the hanging paragraph.208 The court
cannot simply subtract the negative equity from the amount of the loan
because the debtor will likely have made payments on the loan between the
financing date and the petition date.209 The U.C.C. indicates a default rule for
application of payments.210 Payments should be applied according to the
contract between the parties, but, in the absence of a previous agreement,
payments should be applied first to the portion of the loan secured by a
PMSI.211
Although most states have a standard motor vehicle retail installment sale
contract, it is possible that the agreement between the parties could contain any
number of instructions for payment allocation. At least one court has indicated
that in the absence of a clear contract indicating the amount of negative equity
and the application of payments, it would apply the transformation rule instead
of the dual status rule.212 This approach would be unwise and certainly would
not fulfill Congress‘s intent in enacting the hanging paragraph. Therefore, the
bankruptcy courts should not adopt either a default or discretionary rule, but
simply follow the instructions given in the U.C.C.213
V. CONCLUSION
The majority of the circuit courts holding that negative equity can be a
PMSI, AmeriCredit would still have a claim of about $27,000 on a car that was worth approximately
$24,000. Id.
208. See, e.g., In re Conyers, 379 B.R 576, 583 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2007).
209. A related issue is how to allocate the PMSI when negative equity has been financed many
times over. The Los Angeles Times reported the story of one couple that had traded in their cars and
refinanced negative equity five times in the previous three years. Ken Bensinger, New Cars that Are
Fully Loaded—With Debt, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, at A1.
210. U.C.C. § 9-103(e)(3)(B) (2001).
211. Id.; see also Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1290 (10th Cir.
2009) (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (advocating that courts simply use the default rules set out in the
U.C.C. for payment application questions).
212. In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 157–58 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); see also Dienna Ching, Does
Negative Equity Negate the Hanging Paragraph?, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 507–10
(2008). Ching argues that the transformation rule should be the default rule in the absence of
carefully drafted contract language that carves out the negative equity portion of the debt and
specifically provides for payment allocation. Id.
213. A related issue may arise when the market value of the car on the date of filing exceeds
the purchase money portion of the claim. This situation would be resolved by simply using the value
of the car, allowing negative equity to be added to the claim to the extent of the car‘s value. Any
remaining negative equity would be an unsecured claim. This formulation is consistent with the
parties‘ rights under state law. The lender would realize only the value of the car and could assert the
remainder as an unsecured deficiency claim.

2010]

NEGATIVE EQUITY

1253

PMSI blur the line between a security interest and a PMSI. They seem
determined to protect the secured status of the negative equity portion, while
ignoring the fact that, even if the creditor does not have a PMSI in the
negative equity portion of the loan, the lender still has a security interest in the
car.214 The car is encumbered until the loan is paid. It does not matter if the
debtor defaults when the balance is $20,000, $2,000 or $200—the lender still
has its collateral if the loan is in default. So although the negative equity
portion of the loan destroys the purchase money nature of that particular
portion of the security interest, the lender still has a security interest in the
vehicle (outside of bankruptcy) until every dollar, including the negative
equity, is paid back to the creditor.
In the wake of the financial crisis predicated on poor consumer lending
practices, unwise transactions that leave a creditor tremendously undersecured
and a consumer saddled with an unbearable loan should not be condoned by a
process that prides itself on consistency and fairness. The bankruptcy process
is designed to provide overburdened debtors with a fresh start by discharging
their obligations while allowing similarly situated creditors an equal
distribution of the bankrupt‘s assets. While it is true that BAPCPA attempts
to cure and deter some of the most egregious abuses of the bankruptcy system,
the stripping of negative equity from an auto loan is not one of them.
Debtors should be allowed to cram down the negative equity portion of
their car loans, allowing the creditor an unsecured claim for the negative
equity portion. This solution best allows Chapter 13 debtors to keep their
cars—instruments that, for many debtors, allow them to keep working—and
finish their payment plans. It also provides for equal distribution among
claimants that are in the same position. Perhaps Congress meant to include
negative equity in the definition of ―purchase money security interest,‖ but
until Congress clarifies the term by inserting an unambiguous definition into
the Bankruptcy Code, federal courts are left to apply a term from the U.C.C.
that was never intended to have meaning outside of the priority scheme set up
by Article 9. Though eight circuit courts have ruled on this issue, the
continuing dissents and the recent decision reached by the Ninth Circuit
suggest that the answer to the negative equity question is not as obvious as the
circuit courts have made it out to be.215
Congress can and should simply define ―purchase money security
interest‖ in the Bankruptcy Code to clarify the extent to which it meant to
214. Indeed, a vehicle can be used as collateral for most types of consumer loans. See Ford v.
Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1289 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J.,
dissenting) (―[T]he Fords and their dealer were free to use the new pickup as security for a loan to
pay an antecedent debt . . . .‖).
215. As one court put it, the hanging paragraph ―has become the ‗Rorschach Inkblot Test‘ of
the bankruptcy bench and bar.‖ In re Busby, 393 B.R. 443, 448 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2008).
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protect overreaching creditors attempting to claim the protections of purchase
money status. One solution might be to use a definition already contained in
the Bankruptcy Code. Section 547(c)(3) provides that security interests that
secure ―new value‖ related to the purchase of collateral cannot be avoided as
preferences.216 ―New value,‖ in turn, is defined as ―money or money‘s worth
in goods, services, or new credit, . . . but does not include an obligation
substituted for an existing obligation.‖217 The Ninth Circuit relied on this
definition when it found that, while the Bankruptcy Code affords preferential
treatment for certain types of security interests, that treatment is reserved for
situations when ―the obligation relates to the receipt of truly new value, not
just old obligations that have been repackaged.‖218
Until Congress acts, courts faced with this issue should consider the
purposes behind the protections afforded to purchase money creditors and
determine whether car creditors should be entitled to these protections for the
negative equity portion of the loan.
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